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Despite a promising period of higher GDP growth
rates in recent years the development of Sub-
Saharan African economies is still clearly lagging
behind other developing regions. Since 2000, the
annual GDP growth in Sub-Saharan African
economies varied from three to six percent. Growth
rates peaked in 2006–07 and, despite the global
financial crisis, declined only slightly in 2008.
However, for 2009 and subsequent years analysts
expect growth rates to drop significantly to about
two percent as a result of second wave effects of the
crisis, e.g. dropping demand for raw materials, delay-
ing or even suspension of foreign direct investment
projects and decreasing remittances (UNECA 2009;
OECD and AfDB 2009).
In previous decades the economies in Sub-Saharan
Africa stagnated on average below two or even one
percent of annual GDP growth rates.As growth rates
were slightly higher in the 1960s – for many countries
the early years after independence – the average
growth curve of Sub-Saharan Africa economies from
1960 to the present is U-shaped (Ndulu et al. 2007).
Due to an average population growth of two and a
half to three percent, per capita income stagnated or
even declined until 2000 in many Sub-Saharan
African countries as compared to other developing
regions, especially East Asia where higher and more
sustainable growth paths led to an increase in per
capita income already in the 1980–90s.
The recent more dynamic development since 2000 is
therefore definitely a sign of hope for Sub-Saharan
Africa, but among others the following factors do
partly dampen the optimism. Diversification of most
Sub-Saharan African economies is still very low. For
instance,trade openness as measured by the share of
aggregated imports and exports to GDP is quite
high, but, according to OECD and AfDB (2009),
18 out of 45 Sub-Saharan African countries are
exporting just four or even fewer products (mainly
oil, mineral resources and some agricultural prod-
ucts), which accounted for more than 75 percent of
their exports in 2007. UNECA (2007) suggests that
over the last decades reaction of many Sub-Saharan
African countries to the economic crisis has been
rather defensive. While countries in other develop-
ing regions deliberately tried to diversify their
economies, thus making them more competitive and
less prone to external shocks, Sub-Saharan African
countries failed to use e.g. windfalls gains from com-
modity sectors for making strategic investments and
enhance structural change. Needless to say, this can
often be attributed to severe governance problems
and corruption.1
Furthermore, the productivity of the domestic pri-
vate sector has improved rather slowly and is
presently far from converging with the global pro-
ductivity level.UNECA (2009) shows for agriculture
that an increase in land and labour productivity
taken place since the early 1980s was too marginal to
reduce the gap to the rest of the world: for example,
labour productivity increased by 10.6 percent since
1989-1991 but its 2003–2005 level amounted to only
31 percent of the average world labour productivity.
Ndulu et al. (2007) point to the fact that such a com-
petitive disadvantage has also been combined with
the shortfalls in factory-floor productivity,while high
indirect costs have further weakened the relative
performance of the private sector.
Repeatedly the low level of productivity and the low
degree of economic diversification are two of the
main explaining factors for continuously prevailing
low competitiveness of most Sub-Saharan African
economies. The 2009 World Economic Forum’s
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1 Although there is a link between the investment climate and cor-
ruption, this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article.
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Global Competitiveness Index 2009–2010, for
instance, covers overall 133 economies in the world,
including 26 Sub-Saharan African countries of which
21 are positioned at the bottom of the ranking (WEF
2009a and 200b). And despite the relatively high
GDP growth rates experienced since 2000, the
increase in average per capita GNI adjusted by pur-
chasing power parity for Sub-Saharan Africa has
recently been outperformed by the countries in
South Asia.On average,both regions had the similar
per capita GNI level in the mid-1990s but, according
to the latest World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, Sub-Saharan Africa reached its level of
about USD 2,000 in 2008 compared to more than
USD 2,700 in South Asia.
All this puts the pre-crisis growth rates of Sub-
Saharan African economies into perspective and
leaves economists, local policy makers and develop-
ment cooperation with a puzzle: what can be done
and what needs to be done to accelerate the neces-
sary structural change in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Traditional policy approaches cover a broad spec-
trum of strategies from interventionist policies to
stimulate private sector development to the structur-
al adjustment programmes of the 1980s and the con-
cepts of a rather lean state for economic develop-
ment. Recently the World Bank’s approach to
reforming the regulatory environment for businesses
has been widely recommended as the promising
response for promoting enterprise development and
economic growth in developing countries. In the fol-
lowing the relevance of this approach for overcom-
ing the serious bottlenecks of economic develop-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa is discussed.
The ‘Doing Business approach’ to reforming 
business regulations
Since 2004 the World Bank’s Doing Business report
series most prominently advocates for reforming
business regulations in order to foster economic
growth in developing countries – see World Bank
(2009) for the most recent issue. In a nutshell, the
approach recommends lessening regulations in areas
like business and property registration, licences,
employment and taxes as well as enhancing contract
enforcement and strengthening property rights –
particularly with regard to credit and investment.
These recommendations come together with an indi-
cator system that serves as a benchmarking tool.The
Doing Business indicator system basically tries to
capture time and monetary costs accruing to busi-
nesses in these regulatory areas. Countries are
benchmarked against these indicators and ranked
according to their index values, coming up with the
ease-of-doing-business ranking. Most Sub-Saharan
African countries rank poorly in this index, populat-
ing the lower third of the ranking. Although there
are some notable exceptions – like Mauritius that
ranks 17th out of 183 countries, South Africa 34th or
Botswana 45th – the average rank of Sub-Saharan
Africa with its 139th position is the lowest among the
world regions (World Bank 2009).
At the first sight the policy recommendations of the
‘Doing Business approach’ sketched above appears
to be plausible – particularly in the light of the
region’s low ranking in the ease-of-doing-business
index and recalling the region’s low average eco-
nomic development. Nevertheless, in the remainder
of the paper we get somewhat deeper into the sub-
ject and discuss the accuracy of the underlying rea-
soning as well as the relevance of the recommenda-
tions in the context of the various challenges for eco-
nomic development which Sub-Saharan African
countries are currently facing.
With respect to the accuracy of the underlying rea-
soning,it is worthwhile to briefly reflect on the theo-
retical underpinning of the Doing Business ap-
proach.To put it in a simple way,the approach can be
classified as being in the tradition of a specific strand
in institutional economics, namely the public choice
school of thought (Djankov 2009). Contrary to the
neoclassical economics,this school of thought explic-
itly models the state (politicians, bureaucrats) as
being part of the economy and acknowledges the
importance of fundamental institutions of market
economies like the security of private property rights
and contract enforcement that are backed by state
institutions such as registries and courts.These basic
market-enhancing institutions foster trust between
buyers and sellers and reduce transaction costs,
boosting the exchange of goods and services, invest-
ment as well as the supply of finance. In short such
institutional aspects are seen crucial for economic
development.
The normative benchmark of the public choice
school is a setting where state actors limit themselves
to securing this minimal set of institutions and to
correct major market failures. However, this norma-
tive ideal is under constant threat, since politicians
and bureaucrats, being self-interested individuals,CESifo Forum 4/2009 32
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have incentives to establish regulations that are good
for their own personal benefit (so that they can
extract bribes from businesses and citizens) or for
the benefit of business lobby groups (that engage in
rent-seeking and manage to capture politicians and
bureaucrats) but that are detrimental to the welfare
of the economy as a whole. Therefore, regulations
are mainly interpreted as being the result of state
actors pursuing particularistic agendas, restricting
market entry and hampering business activity.
There is some empirical support for this line of argu-
mentation, mainly from cross-country regression
analyses.First,with respect to the relevance and role
of the quality of fundamental institutions Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) estimate the respec-
tive contributions of institutions, geography and
trade integration to economic growth in terms of
GDP per capita in a sample of 80 countries. They
conclude that the quality of institutions, particularly
the level of rule of law and the security of private
property rights, clearly outplays the other factors.
Second, there are several econometric studies using
the Doing Business indicators as independent vari-
ables, particularly the indicator on start-up regula-
tions, finding evidence for a positive correlation
between less regulation and a smaller informal sec-
tor, less corruption, more entrepreneurship and
greater employment opportunities respectively
(World Bank 2009). Third, the Doing Business
reports provide lively examples of highly cumber-
some,lengthy and costly business regulations in Sub-
Saharan African countries,illustrating in a very prac-
tical manner the burden this imposes on many enter-
prises (Sub-Saharan African countries are among
those where registering and legalising an incorporat-
ed firm is most difficult and expensive: e.g. in
Zimbabwe it takes 96 days and the associated cost
equals to five times higher than the country’s per
capita income).2
Nevertheless,one should be cautious when deducing
from this that the policy recommendations put for-
ward in the Doing Business reports will make a great
difference for Sub-Saharan African countries, signif-
icantly enhancing enterprise development and pro-
moting economic growth. Does the overall picture
sketched above really capture the main underlying
reasons for lagging economic development or is it
missing important aspects? In the following, two
arguments are made for revising the conceptualisa-
tion of regulations and institutions and the recom-
mendations deduced in the Sub-Saharan African
context.
First, the social usefulness of regulations and insti-
tutions has to be evaluated looking from two differ-
ent angles: the cost aspect and the benefit aspect.
The Doing Business approach emphasises the cost
angle. This is valid, and – going back to the afore-
mentioned example – there is really no reason from
a social perspective to have regulations in place for
registering an incorporated firm that cost five times
per capita income.3 Cutting this cost will definitely
improve social welfare. However, the measure will
probably fall short in enhancing business growth.
The problem with many formal institutions in Sub-
Saharan Africa is that, in addition to being costly,
they carry little value for economic agents or – to
put it differently – they are not functional: the
results of many surveys of African businesses sup-
port this fact as shown by Krause et al. (2010).
Examples are registries that do not keep records or
courts that do not respect the law. Hence, in general
discussion of de jure content of regulations takes a
back seat regarding the severe problem of lacking
enforcement in many countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. However, it is evident that functional mar-
ket-enhancing institutions,like e.g.business,proper-
ty and credit registries,the courts or business associ-
ations that ‘work’ (i.e. that provide trustful informa-
tion and enforcement rules) are key elements to
enhance economic activity. Therefore, another –
equally important – policy recommendation that
can be drawn from the overall picture sketched,is to
invest in market-enhancing institutions and public
services, e.g. investing in human resources, paying
civil servants better salaries and making procedures
more transparent.
The second argument is linked to the question: what
would be good business-enhancing regulations and
institutions for Sub-Saharan African economies?
The Doing Business approach has quite a clear pic-
ture of what are ‘good’ (and what are ‘bad’) regula-
tions and institutions, inspired in the above sketched
public choice perspective in combination with ‘the
common-sense interpretation of the institutional fac-
tors of success of Anglo-American market econo-
mies’.Like many other approaches that advocate for
institutional reforms in developing countries (for
instance also the ones that call for more state regu-
2 See data from http://www.doingbusiness.org/CustomQuery.
3 Such regulations are probably best explained by the kind of moti-
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lation), the Doing Business approach can be classi-
fied into the ‘top-down view’ of institutional change
(Easterly 2008). This means that it is believed that
improvements in the overall functioning of the insti-
tutional setting can be achieved “with a stroke of a
pen” (World Bank 2007, 12) of the legislator, substi-
tuting old laws and regulations by new ones and
copying the institutional pattern of ‘front-runner’
economies like Britain or the United States.
However, there are good reasons to believe that the
institutional pattern that serves as a model has been
successful in these rich countries because it has
evolved from ‘bottom-up’. The experiences from
land titling in Sub-Saharan Africa provide examples
of how formal institutions introduced ‘top-down’
have little, or in some cases even negative effects, if
they do not fit with local institutions and traditional
rules. For instance, in Kenya the introduction of for-
mal land property titles brought substantial uncer-
tainties into the complex system of customary rights
to land, leading to an increase in opportunistic
behaviour and weak effects on credit use,land yields
and investment. Studies from other countries in the
region corroborate these results (Easterly 2008). In
other words, the successful design and implementa-
tion of regulatory reforms needs a sound under-
standing of local (informal) institutions that are
embedded in the social norms and traditions.
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) outline a typology of
informal institutions and suggest that these can be –
e.g. in the presence of ineffective formal institutions
– either substitutive or competing with the regulato-
ry goals of the formal institutions. Fafchamps (2001)
shows that the crucial role which segmented ethnical
business networks play in many Sub-Saharan
African economies for the exchange of goods and
the provision of commercial loans, can be interpret-
ed as the bottom-up institutional response to the
absence of trustworthy state-backed market-enhanc-
ing institutions.This is clearly a case where the infor-
mal institutions are substituting for the ineffective
formal institutions. Given the importance of these
local institutions for businesses as well as the weak-
ness of the state as backing and enforcing mecha-
nism of western-style regulations and institutions,we
have doubts that adopting the kind of regulatory
reforms recommended by the Doing Business
approach would have substantial effects on business
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. The
evidence rather calls for tailor-made reforms that are
coherent with the local context and build on adapt-
ing existing institutions in order to make them more
market-enhancing and functional.
A broader perspective on obstacles for economic
development in Sub-Saharan Africa
However, even the bottom-up, tailor-made reforms
of business regulation will arguably not be sufficient
to significantly enhance enterprise development.
Which observations do support this statement? 
Let us take a look at what firm owners and business
people regard to be main obstacles for business
development. World Bank Enterprise Surveys4 and
the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion
Surveys (WEF 2007,2009a and 2009b) are providing
extensive data to explore the complexity of obstacles
and opportunities for business development across
countries. The analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa
reveals that apart from the cumbersome business
regulation acting as an obstacle to business develop-
ment, various other factors are also making firms’
investments and profitable operation of businesses
difficult in many countries.Among them several sig-
nificant determinants including infrastructure,
health, education and technology as well as financial
aspects are highlighted in the following.
Data of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in
Africa 2002–20065 as reported in WEF (2007) indi-
cate that not less than 60 percent of firms in low-
income African countries report the lack of or unre-
liable access to electricity as major or very severe
constraint for business development. According to
WEF (2009), African firms complain that nearly
13 percent of working hours are lost due to power
outages, whereas firms in South Asia report just
seven percent. Accessibility of telecommunication,
on the other hand, has seen a major improvement
through private investments in the mobile telecom-
munication infrastructure.This latter development is
surely a ray of hope, as it creates new opportunities
for doing business, eases access to information and
recently even enables groundbreaking innovation in
the area of mobile banking.
Nevertheless, regarding the weak health and educa-
tional systems in many countries in the region it is
obvious that this not only causes social problems and
injustices but also affects economic development.
Above all, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis
severely affect labour productivity and are associat-
ed with high levels of absenteeism and underutilisa-
tion of capacity (in some countries of the region
4 See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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HIV/AIDS prevalence in the working population
ranges between 15 and 40 percent). Due mainly to
the poorly developed healthcare systems, illness fur-
ther weakens the productivity of families because
cash income is diverted from investments in produc-
tive assets to payments for health treatment and bur-
ial expenses and because family members have to
stay at home to care for patients.According to World
Development Indicators for 2007, life expectancy
reached only 51 years in Sub-Saharan Africa com-
pared to 64 years in South Asia – the region with the
next lowest average value.
Despite increases in primary and secondary school
enrolment ratios, tertiary education remains a
problem in many countries in the region. For
instance, the education sub-indicator – simple
average of the normalized scores of adult literacy
and secondary and tertiary enrolment – of the
World Bank’s ‘Knowledge Economy Index’
(KEI)6 shows that most Sub-Saharan African
countries (except Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia,
South African and Zimbabwe) receive a score less
than two on a scale from zero to ten. Enrolment
rates alone are, however, only part of the problem
when it comes to a lack of linking higher educa-
tion to the needs of the private sector. National
innovation systems – i.e. nexuses between univer-
sities, institutions conducting applied research,
private firms and the public sector – are developed
only rudimentarily.According to WEF (2009),on a
scale from one (worst) to seven (best), Sub-
Saharan Africa scored 3.0 for the indicator for
higher education and training, and 2.7 for the indi-
cator for technological readiness.7 In comparison
the region Latin America and the Caribbean
achieved 3.7 and 3.2, while Southeast Asia scored
4.1 and 3.6, respectively.
Regarding the relative weight of obstacles in the
field of skilled labour and labour regulations, per-
ception of business management on the constraints
for firm growth is quite revealing. WEF (2007)
shows that a share of about 21 percent of respon-
dents in Africa assessed the shortage of skilled
labour as a major or very severe growth constraint
for firms, while the corresponding assessment for
the labour regulations amounted to 15 percent of
survey firms.
Finally, access to finance is throughout reported to
be a main obstacle to business development.Accord-
ing to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in Africa
2002–2006 (WEF 2007), more than 50 percent of
firms in low-income (and also 25 percent of firms
located in upper-middle income) countries in Africa
chose the determinant as a major or very severe con-
straint.To be sure,the underdeveloped property reg-
istration system and insufficient collateral security
required for obtaining formal loans is a problem and
therefore the strategy aimed at easing property reg-
istration and establishing credit bureaus – as empha-
sised in the Doing Business reports – is one relevant
part of reforms which addresses increasing access to
finance.
Yet it should be noted that banks have been operat-
ing quite profitable in many Sub-Saharan African
countries due to lending to large clients and the state
(Beck and Honohan 2007). Average real lending
interest rates of 10 to 20 percent prevailed in the
period between 1995 and 2005 are not exactly pro-
viding favourable financing opportunities for busi-
nesses in general. The situation for many small and
medium-sized enterprises is,however,even more dif-
ficult as their financing needs exceed the scope of
microfinance products but, at the same time, these
firms are underserved by commercial banks.This can
partly be explained by high concentration and lack-
ing competition in the banking sector. Beck and
Honohan (2007) argue that in selected 22 African
countries the market share of the top three banks
averages 73 percent in each country,and show that at
least three major background dimensions negatively
affect banking efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa:
namely “the contractual and informational environ-
ment, the broader issues of systemic risk, and the
lack of scale.Together these dimensions can explain
the high risk premiums demanded by bankers, the
high profitability,and the lack of competition”(Beck
and Honohan 2007, 41).
Conclusion
In a review of private sector development in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Altenburg and von Drachenfels
(2008) highlight five fundamental weaknesses and
shortcomings prevailing in the enterprise sector,
which currently lead to the serious structural prob-
lems in this region.They include:(1) widespread and
rising ‘informality’; (2) a ‘missing middle’– i.e. there
are some profitable large firms and many struggling
6 For the Knowledge Assessment Methodology, see 
http://www.worldbank.org/kam.
7 Both indicators are a mix of hard data and results from an opin-
ion survey among senior management respondents in 26 Sub-
Saharan African countries.CESifo Forum 4/2009 35
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micro and small firms which however lack the
upward mobility; (3) weak inter-firm linkages; (4)
lack of export competitiveness;and finally (5) lack of
innovation capabilities. Without a doubt the regula-
tory environment also plays a significant role with
regard to explaining some of these characteristics.
For instance, a business owner may decide not to
register his business due to the associated cost result-
ing from cumbersome procedures and thus stay
informal. Furthermore, incentives for formation of
inter-firm linkages are certainly lower if business
transactions are more difficult and costly because of
weak property rights and contract enforcement
mechanisms.
Nevertheless, we argue that the World Bank’s highly
advertised ‘Doing Business approach’ to regulatory
reform is not the answer to these structural problems
in Sub-Saharan African economies, mainly due to
three reasons:
• It focuses on reducing the private cost of regula-
tions – which is only one part of the coin – and
neglects increasing the functionality and social
value of market-enhancing institutions and regu-
lations – which is at least equally important.
• It advocates for a top-down institutional reform
that follows a predetermined set of institutions
and regulations inspired in ‘western-style’ market
economies – without paying attention to whether
this fits with traditional rules and local institu-
tions that have developed from bottom up and
without paying attention to potential adverse
effects.
• Structural problems can hardly be solved by
‘only’ reforming the regulatory business environ-
ment. What is needed in addition, are targeted
policies in the areas of infrastructure, education
and technology,health as well as access to finance
in order to increase the competitiveness of firms
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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